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I. INTRODUCTION
Law has long been an area in which expert system technologies
are applied. Numerous legal expert systems, computer systems that
perform tasks normally regarded as requiring intelligence, have been
created. However, the practical benefit of such systems has been less
than predicted. The operation of early systems failed to account for
the complexity and subtlety of the law and of legal reasoning.
Researchers in artificial intelligence and law have investigated
various proposals to make such systems more realistic. The last dec-
ade has seen a resurgence in interest in artificial neural networks
(hereinafter neural nets). Neural nets are computer models inspired by
biological neural systems in the brain. Researchers believe that by
mimicking the underlying structure of the brain they will be better
able to mimic the intelligent tasks performed. In the field of law, it is
believed that neural nets can overcome some of the limitations associ-
ated with existing legal expert systems.
This paper will examine existing and proposed uses of neural
nets in the law focusing on the jurisprudential implications and limita-
tions inherent in those proposals. It is divided into six parts. Follow-
ing this introduction is a technical overview of neural nets, in order to
outline their benefits and limitations. This is followed by a discussion
of the nature of legal reasoning and the various models proposed to
described it. With this background, part four examines various current
and proposed uses of neural nets in law. Part five provides a jurispru-
dential examination of these uses. This paper concludes with some
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remarks on the uses made of neural nets in the law and the promise
they provide for future research into the creation of legal expert sys-
tems.
I1. INTRODUCTION TO NEURAL NETS
A. Artificial Intelligence
In the artificial intelligence community, there are several ap-
proaches to modelling human intelligence.' One approach applicable
to the legal domain is the use of symbolic reasoning systems, which
are called expert systems. These systems are called symbolic systems
because they transform symbols representing things in the real world
into other symbols according to explicit rules.2
Expert systems have a database of hierarchical rules, variables
and constants that they apply to a given problem to try and determine
a solution.3 However, symbolic systems have several limitations,
including:
(1) Not all knowledge can be stated symbolically; and
(2) Developing and maintaining the system is time consuming.
The problem of trying to symbolically formalize knowledge can be
enormous. It has been found that where there are gray areas to a prob-
lem, the resolution of which involves the weighing of a multitude of
factors, experts often reach a conclusion and then ex post facto justify
it according to their hierarchy of symbolic rules. Rules, then, do not
seem to capture all that is involved in expert knowledge.'
Secondly, the actual construction and maintenance of the system
is complex and time consuming due to a-knowledge acquisition bottle-
neck. The system's creators must explicitly code every rule and predi-
cate manipulated by a symbolic reasoner. The system then has to be
debugged to ensure the database is free of errors and operates as pre-
dicted. Any changes made to the database, either through changes in
or expansion of the knowledge of the system, have to be incorporated
through the same time-consuming process. To make these systems
1. The term "modelling human intelligence" is herein used to refer to attempts to model
the results achieved by humans when solving problems. How those results are achieved by a
human and by a computer may be quite different.
2. RAYMOND Kuazwa., THE AGE OF INTELuGENT MACHINES 16-18 (1990).
3. See generally JoHN ZELEmKOW & DANIEL HuNTR, BuiLDrNG INTELLIGENT LEGAL
INFoRmATION SYSrEms - REPREsENTATIoN AND REAsoNG IN LAW, ch. 6 (1995) (Computer
Law Series No. 13, 1986) (explaining symbolic reasoning using rules and logic).
4. KuRzwEru, supra note 2.
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intelligent requires a great deal of work by a domain expert working in
conjunction with a knowledge engineer.5
Neural nets adopt an alternative approach to modelling intelli-
gence. In neural nets, the relations between pieces of information do
not have to be explicitly specified. Instead, the neural net learns the
relationships between the information. For this reason neural nets are
subsymbolic reasoners; the system's designers do not have to explic-
itly state the relationship between pieces of information in the form of
symbols. These aspects of neural nets have led to resurgent interest in
their use in intelligent computer systems.
B. Neural Nets
Neural nets6 are computer models inspired by the structure of
biological neural systems. Biological neural systems are composed of
Dendites
Respon
FIGURE 1. STRUCTURE OF A BIOLOGICAL NEURON
5. A domain expert is an expert in the subject matter in which the expert system is sought
to be constructed. A knowledge engineer is someone who works with the domain expert to
collect that expert's knowledge and assemble it for use in the legal expert system. KURZWEIL,
supra note 2.
6. See generally MAUREEN CAUDILL & CHARLES BUTLER, NATURALLY INTELLIGENT SY.
TEms (1990) [hereinafter NATURALLY INTELLIGENT SYSTEMS]. For a detailed discussion of neu-
ral-net concepts and theory, see DAVID RUMELHART ET AL., PARALLEL DISTRIBUTED PROCESSUNO:
EXPLORATIoNs IN THE MICROsTRUcruRE OF COGNITION (1986). For a 'hands on' introduction to
neural nets, the computer package of Caudill & Butler is useful. See MAUREEN CAUDILL &
CHARLES BUTLR, UNDERsTANDNO NEURAL NErwoRrs: COMPUTER EXPLORATIONS (1992).
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millions of neurons. Each neuron accepts input from the many thou-
sand other neurons to which it is connected and in turn sends its output
to many thousand other neurons. Neurons are connected by axons and
by dendrites. A neuron receives signals from other neurons through
dendrites and sends its signal to other neurons through its axon.
Where a dendrite connects to another neuron there is a synapse.
Synapses are plastic in the sense that the strength of their connection
to the neuron can increase or decrease. A strong signal passing
through a weak synapse may have the same effect as a weak signal
passing through a strong synapse. Synapses can also be inhibitory or
excitory. They can either inhibit the activity of the receiving neuron
or increase its activity. The inputs that a neuron receives cause it to
have some degree of excitation. This level of excitation results in the
neuron generating a certain output which it in turn transfers along its
axon to the neurons accepting input from it.
Neural nets mimic this structure. Neural nets are composed of
neurodes. A neurode is a mathematical model of a biological neuron.
Neurodes are connected through synaptic weights to other neurodes,
which creates a network. What group of neurodes each neurode ac-
cepts input from, what output a neurode generates from its inputs and
to which other group of neurodes the output is sent, all determine the
way the neural net will behave. One of the major goals in neural net
research has been to construct neural nets capable of learning. In bio-
logical systems, experiments show that one of the most important ef-
fects of learning at the cellular level is the modification of the strength
of the synaptic connection between two neurons. Analogously, train-
ing a neural net is a matter of modifying the values of the synaptic
weights in the system. Unfortunately, training is a complex task, and
the method used depends on the architecture of the network in
question.
Contrary to the optimistic hopes of early neural net researchers, it
is not possible to simply connect many neurodes in a random fashion
and hope that they will perform a meaningful task. As in biology,
neurodes must be connected in a particular structure.
All neural nets, however, operate as some form of pattern classi-
fier. During its training, the neural net learns to associate a certain
pattern presented on its input with a certain pattern on its output. This
process is known as pattern association. Further, neural nets have the
property that they can generalize their input. This process is known as
pattern generalization. Neural nets can learn the characteristics of a
general category of objects based on a series of specific examples
from that category. This ability to classify patterns is retained even
1996]
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when the neural net is presented with partial patterns. The neural net
will infer the general category to which the partial input belongs. 7
Researchers have experimented with various structures for con-
structing neural nets ranging from the simplest single neurode to com-
plex hybrid networks. The major drawback in simple networks is that
they can only classify linearly separable problems.8 They cannot be
trained to correctly classify every possible collection of patterns.
This problem of linear separability can be overcome by using
networks of three or more layers. It has been proved that such net-
works can map any input set to any output set,9 subject to one limita-
tion: all neural nets, including multilayer neural nets, can only map
contradictory input patterns by reaching a compromise between those
input patterns. Neural nets cannot take one input pattern and map it to
two separate outputs. The consequence of this will be discussed in
part five.
Adaptive filter networks are multilayer neural nets and are
trained using back-propagation techniques.'" Although adaptive filter
networks must undergo supervised learning, 1' they are perhaps the
most common form of neural net used. While much more sophisti-
cated neural nets than adaptive filter networks exist, many are ex-
tremely complex and are difficult to implement and tune. For this
reason, such networks remain largely at the research stage. Unless
7. See generally NATURALLY INTELLmErN SYSTEMS, supra note 6, at 3.
8. The classic example of the problem of linear separability is the XOR problem. In the
graph below, it is not possible to draw a single straight line that separates all the O's and all the
X's, thus they are not linearly separable. Id. at 173-74.
X2
0 1 X
-I 1
X - - 0
9. Id. at 174-77 (discussing Kolmogorov's theorem).
10. Back-propagation is a technique whereby the error made by a neural net in classifying
a pattern can be progressively reduced, so that it reaches an "acceptable level." Id. at 183-96.
11. Supervised learning is a procedure for training a neural net. The neural net is
presented with an input pattern and the output that is desired when that input pattern is presented.
The neural net learns to associate the input pattern with the output pattern. The learning is
supervised because the creator of the neural net must present the two patterns to the network and
also oversee that learning is occurring correctly. An obvious requirement of such training is that
for every input pattern there must be a known output pattern; this is impossible in some environ-
ments, including some legal applications. Id.
NEURAL NETWORKS
Input
Neurodes
Input layer
Hidden
layer
Output layer
Information
flow
Output
FIGuRE 2. GENERAL STRUCTURE OF AN ADAPTIVE
FILTER NEURAL NET
otherwise specified, general reference to neural nets in this paper will,
thus, concern adaptive filter networks.
C. Benefits of Neural Nets
The use of neural networks in the creation of legal expert systems
can overcome some of the limitations of symbolic systems. Neural
nets can make inferences from incomplete information and classify
patterns (both by matching past information and generalizing that past
information). This makes them promising candidates for use in vari-
ous tasks performed by legal expert systems. More importantly, the
ability of neural nets to learn may aid in overcoming the knowledge
acquisition bottleneck associated with symbolic reasoning systems.
As will be discussed in part four, various current and proposed
uses for neural nets in legal expert systems attempt to exploit these
properties.
III. INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING
It is obviously a prerequisite to know what the nature of law is
and what the process of legal reasoning involved before incorporating
legal knowledge in a computer and making the computer manipulate
19961
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that knowledge to emulate the legal reasoning process, i.e., the results
achieved by lawyers. 2
This discussion will focus largely on the processes involved in
legal reasoning, which are the actual steps undertaken when a lawyer
is presented with a problem, decides on the applicable law, applies the
law to the problem, and thereby reaches a conclusion. A discussion of
the nature of law itself is important to this examination. However,
traditional jurisprudential debates such as those between natural law-
yers, positivists and realists, over issues such as the validity of the law
or the duty to obey the law will not be discussed, as they are periph-
eral to the present examination.
A. Methods of Reasoning
There are three common methods of human reasoning:
(1) deductive reasoning;
(2) inductive reasoning; and
(3) analogical reasoning.
Detailed expositions of each type of reasoning have been given else-
where. 3 However, a short explanation is worthwhile.
Deductive reasoning is a strict logical method of reasoning. De-
ductive arguments take the following general form:
(A) In any case, if p then q;
(B) In the present case p;
(C) Therefore, in the present case, q.
In this form of reasoning, one moves from the application of general
rules to specific facts to deduce an outcome. The premises require and
justify the conclusion. It is illogical to accept the general rule and the
specific instance, but to deny the conclusion. 4 However, the applica-
tion of the general rule to the specific instance is contingent on that
instance being regarded as a member of the general class defined in
the rule. In terms of the above example, the "q" referred to in line (C)
must be regarded as similar enough to the "q" in line (A) before de-
ductive application of the rule can occur.
Inductive reasoning essentially operates as the reverse of deduc-
tive reasoning. Here, one starts with numerous observations and then
12. In this paper "lawyer" is used widely to refer to those who are involved in reasoning
with and applying the law. Thus it would include judges, solicitors, banisters and legal academ-
ics. ZEL.zNmow & HuNzrmR, supra note 3, at 13.
13. See, e.g., THE ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHnuosoPHY (Paul Edwards ed., 1967).
14. NanL MAcCoRMCK, LEGAL RF.AsoNio AND LEGAL THEoRY 21-22 (1978).
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tries to relate them by creating a rule that can "explain" each observa-
tion. For example the following situations are observed:
Facts Outcome
ABCDEFG X
ABCDEF X
ABCDEGK X
MNOPE Y
Rules can be stated that explain each outcome;
(A) "If (A B C D E) then X;" and
(B) "If (M N 0 P E) then Y."
The validity of such rules, though, remains contingent.1 5
Analogical reasoning, in contrast to deductive reasoning and in-
ductive reasoning, is not immediately concerned with the application
of rules. Here, one simply says that a certain outcome should result
because that outcome has previously occurred in a similar case. This
is a manifestation of the formal principle of justice that "like cases are
to be treated alike and different cases differently."16
Analogical reasoning and inductive reasoning are quite closely
related. 7 One only considers that the outcome of two situations
should be similar because their facts are similar, by following the rule
that like cases should be decided alike. This can itself be seen as the
corollary of the more general belief that if two situations have the
same outcome, then there must be a general rule that explains them.
Thus, in saying that two similar factual situations must have similar
outcomes, we are really saying that this would be the result from the
application of a hypothetical general rule that would contain both situ-
15. See MAanN GOLDiNG, LEcAL REASON NG 43-44 (1984). It is always possible that a
factual situation will arise that has an outcome different to that previously observed, thus invali-
dating the rule founded on the earlier situations.
16. James Murray, The Role of Analogy in Legal Reasoning, 29 UCLA L. REv. 833, 849
(1982).
17. GoLDiNG, supra note 15, at 44 (stating that induction is simply another form of anal-
ogy). While they are closely related, there is a difference between analogy and induction, out-
lined below. See discussion infra parts V.A.3, V.A.4.
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ations18 Likewise, it is only possible to suppose that a general rule
can explain several situations if one regards those situations as similar
to each other.
In this respect, the mental processes in inductive and analogical
reasoning are very similar. In both cases, general rules explaining fac-
tual situations are assumed to exist. However, only in inductive rea-
soning does one take the step of trying to explicitly state those rules.
More fundamentally, inductive reasoning and analogical reasoning are
both inherently dependent on the finding of similarity between
situations.
B. Legal Reasoning
To what extent does legal reasoning involve each of the above
types of reasoning? The answer depends on the nature of the legal
system. If the law is a system of rules, the use of induction and anal-
ogy will be far more limited than will be the case if law is not totally
rule based. Not surprisingly, questions about the nature of law are
intertwined with questions about the nature of legal reasoning. As
Neil MacCormick states, "A theory of legal reasoning requires and is
required by a theory of law."19
Two views on the nature of law can be outlined:
(A) Law is a series of well defined rules of universal application;
and
(B) Law is not rule based; legal outcomes are wholly dependent on
the views of the parties, lawyers and the judge in a case.20
Of course, few if any jurisprudes adhere to these extreme versions of
either approach.21 While it would be fruitless to try to conclusively
determine the nature of law, it will be argued that law's true nature
does not lie at either of the extremes presented, but incorporates as-
pects of both positions.
18. MAcCoRMNcKC, supra note 14, at 163.
19. Id. at 229.
20. See generally MAcCoRMICK, supra note 14, at 197, 229; ZELEZMIow & HUNTEa,
supra note 3, at 53-66. The first of these views is an extreme version of the legal positivism of
H.L.A. Hart. See generally H.L.A. HART, Tan CONCEPT OF LAW (2d ed. 1994). The second
view is an extreme version of the arguments presented by the American legal realists and mem-
bers of the critical legal studies and post modernist movements. See generally, MAROARET DA.
vms, AsiNo =h LAW QuEmsroN (1994); Alan Hunt, The Big Fear: Law Confronts
Postmodernism, 35 McGmL L. J. 507 (1990).
21. See MAcComucKc, supra note 14, at 197. But see Joseph William Singer, The Player
and the Cards: Nihilism and Legal Theory, 94 YALE L. J. 1 (1984); John Stick, Can Nihilism be
Pragmatic?. 100 HARv. L. Ray. 332 (1986) (replying to Singer).
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Levi has given a useful breakdown of the process of legal reason-
ing, which he sees occurring in three steps: "(1) Similarity is seen
between cases; (2) The rule of law inherent in the first case is an-
nounced; and (3) The rule of law is made applicable to the second
case. ' 2  While Levi's description of the legal reasoning process may
not capture all that is involved in legal reasoning, it does reveal that
perhaps the key step in legal reasoning is the finding of similarity, or
difference, between cases and aspects of a case.
In this context, MacCormick and Burton note that the finding of
similarity is dependent on the overall purposes that the legal system is
trying to achieve.23 The classification of facts for the purposes of fit-
ting them into the major premise of a deduction and for the purposes
of creating analogies and inducing rules, occurs in a whole body of
knowledge and theory we use to make sense of the world.2 4 When
deciding between competing fact classifications, our evaluation inher-
ently involves considerations of the consequences of each classifica-
tion on our model of the world and in this sense similarities,
dissimilarities, classifications, and thus, the meaning and scope of
rules are made and not found.
2 5
1. Deductive Legal Reasoning
That deduction plays a role in legal reasoning is difficult to
deny.26 Statutes are collections of relatively clearly-stated rules, and
thus, the application of statutory law involves a large amount of de-
ductive reasoning.2 7 One begins with a statutory requirement, applies
it to the facts, and thus, determines the outcome. However, applying
the statute to the facts is a complex process.
Firstly, before a deduction can occur, the facts have to be fitted
within the language of the statute. This is a nonobvious step, as facts
can be logically characterized in several ways.2 1 Thus, a logical de-
22. EDWARD LEvI, AN INTODucToN To LEGAL .REASONwNG 1 (1948). See also STRvEN
BURToN, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REAsONNG 26-39 (1985) (discussing a similar
taxonomy). But see Murray, supra note 16, at 848-50 (critiquing Levi). For present purposes this
criticism is not important.
23. MAcCowaxcl, supra note 14, at 101-108; BURTON, supra note 22, at 103.
24. MAcCoRMCKc, supra note 14, at 103.
25. Id., ch. 5, ch. 7; Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in Adjudication: A Critical
Phenomenology, 36 J. LEGAL EDUC. 518 (1986).
26. MAcCoRMIC, supra note 14, ch 2; BuRToN, supra note 22; Juuus STON-E, LEGAL
SYsmm A LAWYER'S REAsoN NGs chs. 6-7 (1964); Cf LLOYD OF HAmpsTEAD, LLOYD'S IN-
TRODUCTION TO JuRisPRUDENcE 1139, fn. 95 (1985) (for a list of authorities who deny deduction
plays a role in legal reasoning).
27. MACCoR xc, supra note 14, at 19.
28. BURToN, supra note 22, at 44-50; STONE, supra note 26, at 55-58.
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duction can only occur if the facts are regarded as similar enough to
the language of the statute to be classed as covered by the statute. As
Edward Levi notes, "The scope of a rule of law, and therefore its
meaning depends upon a determination of what facts will be consid-
ered similar to those present when the rule was first announced. ' 2 9
Secondly, there is the closely related problem of deciding what
meaning to give terms within a statute. For example, section 91(1) of
the Crimes Act (1958) (Vic.) states, "A person shall be guilty of an
offence, if when not at his place of abode, he has with him any article
for use in the course of or in connexion with any burglary . .. ."
While classifying an article as within section 91 of the Act may be
easy in some cases, this is not always so. What of a tool box? All the
items therein could be used during a burglary, yet all could have legiti-
mate uses. Whether an article is for use in the course of a burglary is a
matter for debate.
This problem, of determining the meaning of individual phrases
in rules, is called the problem of "open texture."3 Resolving the
problem of open texture is inherently dependent on the use of anal-
ogy.3 Thus, even in this, the perhaps most rule-guided area of law,
where all the rules are collected and clearly expressed, the purely de-
ductive application of rules is not sufficient to solve all problems.
Similar problems arise when reasoning in the common law. It is
often said that there are common law "rules." However, in a strict
sense, this cannot be true. The whole of the common law has been
created on an individual case by case basis. In a single case, a judge
can do no more than pronounce a decision that applies to the facts of
the case. It could be argued that the ratio decidendi expresses the rule
contained in a case.32 This rule will be binding on all subsequent
cases that have the same facts as the original case. However, the bind-
ing nature of the ratio decidendi (and thus the scope of the rule) is
severely limited once it is appreciated that the ratio only applies to the
strict facts of the original case. It will only determine the outcome of
another case that has exactly the same facts. Strictly, any change in
29. LEw, supra note 22, at 2. Similarly Lloyd notes that it has "long been accepted that a
case only binds as to 'like facts.' But what are like facts... ." LLOYD, supra note 26, at 1116.
While given as a discussion of rules in the common law, this is equally applicable to statutory
rules.
30. MAcCoPaciK, supra note 14, at 66.
31. Id.; Lvi, supra note 22; BuRTON, supra note 22.
32. RuEtma CRoss & J. HARms, PRxcnnar IN ENGLusH LAW (1991).
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the facts results in a new situation, the outcome of which is not deter-
mined by the ratio decidendi.33
The belief that there are common law rules arises because, even
though the ratio of one case may not be binding in a later case, if the
latter case has very similar facts to the original case, the ratio is never-
theless felt to be highly persuasive.34 Thus, the second case is decided
similarly to the first. As this process continues, a large body of cases
builds up, all of which have similar facts and similar outcomes. See-
ing this collection of cases, it is not unreasonable to assume that the
original case laid down a general rule, which dictated the results in all
the latter cases.3" In this way, the common law appears to create rules
that can later be applied deductively. 36 Even in such usage though,
these common law rules experience the same problems as statutory
rules.
2. Inductive and Analogical Legal Reasoning
The process of induction will often be used in framing the ratio
of leading cases and the construction of novel legal arguments.
Before a leading case, there often exists numerous cases with vaguely
similar facts and similar outcomes. However, each has been decided
in a relatively individual way. When a leading case is decided, the
judges will look at the previous cases and surmise that, since they
have similar facts and similar outcomes, there must be a general rule
or unifying doctrine that explains all the cases. In this way, the gen-
eral rule-like pronouncements contained in the ratio of the leading
case will have been induced from the previous cases.37 The same pro-
cess occurs when counsel advances a new unifying rule in argument.
As with reasoning by analogy, the use of inductive reasoning in the
law can be seen as an inherent consequence of the requirement for
coherence within the legal system as enunciated by MacCormick.38
33. MAcCoRMIC, supra note 14, at 219-24; STo E, supra note 26, at 267-74. Indeed,
Stone regards the multitude of ratios that exist in a decision as requiring extreme skepticism
about the ability of computers ever to reason with cases. Id. at 37-38; Cf. CRoss & HARMIS,
supra note 32.
34. This results from the need for reality and coherence in the legal system. MAC-
CorupcK, supra note 14.
35. Id. at 216-218.
36. In truth though, common law rules only serve to hide the cases underlying the sup-
posed rule and to mask the reaching of a decision by analogy. BURTON, supra note 22, at 60;
Lav, supra note 22, at 8-9.
37. CRoss & HA.uus, supra note 32, at 191-192. Levi states that thinking of case-law
reasoning as inductive is erroneous. However, he agrees that case law concepts can be created
out of particular instances, since there is movement from the particular to the general LEvi,
supra note 22, at 27.
38. MAcCoRMICK, supra note 14, ch. 7.
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The use of analogical reasoning in law has been widely studied.39
As with deductive legal reasoning and inductive legal reasoning, such
descriptions emphasize the necessity of finding similarities between
cases before any analogy can be constructed.40
Assume that the following cases have the following factors:
Case 1: AB CD;
Case 2: A B C E;
Case 3: A B C F; and
Case 4: A B C G.
Further, assume that Case 1 and Case 2 are regarded as analogous.
From this it can be implied that factors D and E are similar. Again,
assume that Case 1 and Case 3 are not regarded as analogous, imply-
ing that factors D and F were not similar. How is Case 4 to be classi-
fied? This depends on whether factor G is regarded as more similar to
factor D or more similar to factor F.
A consequence of the importance of the finding of similarity to
the process of legal reasoning is that extreme versions of legal positiv-
ism do not seem supportable. Since deductive reasoning is by itself
insufficient to explain legal reasoning, law must be composed of more
than purely rules. Nor, however, can it be accepted that legal reason-
ing is totally subjective;41 legal rules provide a paradigm that guides
legal thought.42
This view of legal reasoning, as a process inherently dependent
on the finding of similarity between situations and on our world theo-
ries, has consequences for the use of neural nets in legal expert
systems.
IV. CURENT AND PROPOSED USES OF NEuRAL NETS IN THE LAW
Mirroring resurging interest in the general artificial intelligence
community, the use of neural nets in law has recently received grow-
ing interest. Neural nets have been used and have been proposed to be
used in the law in two broad manners:
39. Id.; LEVi, supra note 22; BuRTON, supra note 22; SToNE, supra note 26; Murray, supra
note 16; James Gordley, Legal Reasoning: An Introduction, 72 CAL. L. REv. 139 (1984); Cass
Sunstein, On Analogical Reasoning, 106 HARv. L. REv. 741 (1993).
40. E.g., SToNE, supra note 26, at 283.
41. Steven Burton, Reaffirming Legal Reasoning: The Challenge from the Lejf, 36 J.
LEGAL Eouc. 358 (1986). Compare Singer, supra note 21 with Stick, supra note 21.
42. K. Hamilton, Prolegomenon to Myth and Fiction in Legal Reasoning, Common Law
Adjudication and Critical Legal Studies, 35 WAYNE L. REv. 1449 (1989).
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(1) as and within inference engines43 in legal expert systems; and
(2) in legal information retrieval systems..
This part will discuss and explain each of these proposed uses. The
following part will discuss some of the jurisprudential implications
arising from these proposed uses.
A. Neural Nets As and Within Inference Engines
Before examining the current and proposed uses of neural nets in
the law, it is beneficial to have an understanding of more traditional
techniques for computerizing legal knowledge.
As Stephen I. Gallant explains, there is no definitive definition of
"what constitutes an expert system."'  However, for the purposes of
this discussion, the following loose definition will be adopted: a legal
expert system is a computer program capable of performing tasks usu-
ally performed by a lawyer "at the standard of (and sometimes even at
a higher standard than) human experts in given fields."45 In this re-
spect, expert systems and information retrieval systems are very simi-
lar: both require aspects of intelligence. However, only in an expert
system does the system try to reason with the law.
1. Traditional Legal Expert System Inference
Mechanisms
It has been widely noted in the artificial intelligence and law re-
search community that the dominant reasoning paradigm used in legal
expert systems is that of symbolic reasoning.46 Both production rule
expert systems and symbolic case based reasoners47 adopt this ap-
proach. Production rule expert systems seek to encode law in the form
of rules of logic. Symbolic case based reasoners encode aspects of
cases, such as the factual attributes, which then undergo transforma-
tions and are reasoned with according to explicit rules.4"
43. An inference engine is a part of an expert system that is "a system for applying the
rules [of the system's database] to the knowledge base to make decisions." KURZWEIL, supra
note 2, at 293.
44. STna'P. I. GALANT, NEUAL NETwORK LEARNrNG AND EXPERT SYSTEMS 255-261
(1993).
45. ZEr.EZIOW & HUrTER, supra note 3, at 68. The authors note that the actual task that
a legal expert system will perform varies markedly according to its intended user. Id.
46. E.g., Kenneth Lambert & Mark Grunewald, Legal Theory and Case-Based Reasoners:
The Importance of Context and the Process of Focusing, TrIR hr'L CONF. ON ARTMciAL
INTELLiGENcE & L. 191 (1991).
47. Case based reasoners are expert systems that try to reason using a corpus of cases
rather than explicit rules. ZELE Nmow & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 182.
48. John Zeleznikow et al., The IKBALS Project: Multi-Modal Reasoning in Legal Knowl-
edge Based Systems, 2 ARTIFicL. INTELUiGENCE & L. 169, 171-72 (1993).
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2. Problems with Traditional Inference Mechanisms
A major jurisprudential problem with symbolic reasoning sys-
tems is that they depend upon legal knowledge being composed of
explicitly stated rules. As argued in the previous part, however, law is
composed of more than just rules.
Further, the developers of symbolic reasoning systems assume
that deductive reasoning is the only mode of reasoning applied in the
law. Although analogical reasoning is emulated in symbolic case-
based reasoners, what is actually implemented in such systems is only
a crude simulation of human analogical reasoning. Symbolic case-
based reasoners rely on explicit rules of how cases and case attributes
can be manipulated. It is assumed that, through the deductive applica-
tion of these rules, analogical reasoning will emerge. As a complete
model of analogical reasoning, this is a dubious assumption.
Thirdly, symbolic reasoners experience difficulties in resolving
conflicts between rules in their rule databases.4 9 Such conflicts can
only be resolved with metarules. Again, this assumes that the law is a
deepening spiral of rules, which is jurisprudentially suspect.50
Finally, there are practical problems in the creation of symbolic
reasoners. Such systems experience a knowledge acquisition bottle-
neck."1 Any changes in the relevant law will require a modification of
the database, which then needs to be debugged - a time-consuming
process.
The use of neural nets in legal expert systems has been proposed
as a means to overcome these problems. These proposals will be ex-
amined below.
3. Proposed Uses for Neural Nets in Legal Expert
System Inference Mechanisms
(a) Reasoning with Cases
It was argued in part three that the law cannot be regarded purely
as a system of rules; analogical reasoning from past cases is extremely
important. Neural nets may find application in systems that reason
49. For example, if the database contained the two rules "As between two innocents he
who caused the damage should pay" and "No liability without fault" it is unclear how these rules
are both to be applied in a no-fault accident. The resolution of this conflict must be resolved by
reference to other tests.
50. DAvms, supra note 20, ch. 7 (demonstrating how both Hart's concept of a rule of
recognition and Kelsen's concept of a grundnorm would necessarily import extra.legal assump-
tions into the legal system).
51. See supra part II (discussing the problem of knowledge acquisition bottleneck in sym-
bolic reasoners).
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with cases. David Warner has stated that a large benefit of neural nets
is their ability to classify patterns and so imitate the analogical reason-
ing process, thereby resolving issues of open texture. 2 However,
before this claim can be sustained, the precise nature of the analogical
reasoning process needs to be investigated.
i. Analogy
As outlined in the previous part, an important aspect of analogi-
cal reasoning is the classification of patterns into similar groups; only
things that are similar can be used in an analogical argument. Neural
nets are inherently good at pattern classification,53 which makes them
seemingly promising candidates for emulating the analogical reason-
ing process.
The use of neural nets to mimic this aspect of analogical reason-
ing has been investigated by Hobson and Slee. They have produced a
neural network "index" of the Theft Act 1968 (England). 4 In this
index, a factual situation is analyzed by the researchers for the pres-
ence or absence of various concepts, the concepts being specified by
the wording of the Act. The presence or absence of each concept re-
sults in a matrix that is then used as the input to their neural net. The
verdict on whether or not the factual situation constitutes theft within
the meaning of the terms of the Act is used as the desired output for
the neural net.
Using this material, Hobson and Slee claim a neural net can be
trained to classify cases covered by the Act.55 During training, the
neural net groups the cases used to train it into general groups.
Once trained, new cases can be presented to the neural net. In
reaching a verdict on a new case, the neural net classifies the case into
one of the general groups created during training. In so classifying a
case, the neural net appears to mimic analogical reasoning; similar
cases result in the same verdict.
52. See David R. Warner, Jr., A Neural Network Based Law Machine: Initial Steps, 18
RUrGERs CoMPtrrma & TECH. L.J. 51, 51-54 (1992); David R. Warner, Jr., The Role of Neural
Networks in the Law Machine Development, 16 RUTGERS COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 129, 139
(1990) (discussing how a neural network can be used as a model to resolve the "open-texture"
problem in the legal reasoning process).
53. All neural nets operate as some form of pattern classifier. They learn to associate
certain general input patterns with certain general output patterns. See supra part II.
54. John Hobson & David Slee, Indexing the Theft Act 1968 for Case Based Reasoning
[CBRJ and Artificial Neural Networks [ANNs], FOURTH INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFICIAL INTELLI-
GENCE & L., COMPUTERS & ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE (1994).
55. Success in this respect must be understood to mean performing a classification, accord-
ing to the index points chosen by the creators, which is the same as that which the creators would
arrive at using those same index points.
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Similar work has been performed by Trevor Bench-Capon, who
has created a neural net based on a hypothetical statute.16 Bench-Ca-
pon's investigation is of further interest in that it demonstrates that a
neural net can successfully perform classifications even when
presented with a lot of "noise" (inputs that are not relevant to the clas-
sification). Thus, contrary to what other commentators have said,57
neural nets have the potential to operate successfully even when the
factors affecting the classification are not known.5 8
In contrast to the above two approaches, which essentially try to
model whole areas of law using neural nets, Walker et al. (the "VUA
team") simply use neural nets within a more conventional case based
reasoning system.5 9 The VUA team have created PROLEXS, a hybrid
legal expert system, which relies on more than one model of legal
reasoning. Early versions of the system operated by having a stored
database of cases, each case being stored as a set of conditions each
with an associated fixed weight, along with a case threshold.6 ° When a
case was to be applied analogically, the weights on conditions present
in the current fact situation were summed and then compared to the
case threshold of the past case to determine whether the current situa-
tion was analogous to the stored case. 61 In the first implementations
of PROLEXS, the condition weights and the threshold values had to
be assigned by the domain expert. However, the VUA team noted that
weight and threshold assignment is a difficult task for a human do-
main expert.62 Consequently, the latest version of PROLEXS dis-
penses with the case database within the case based reasoning sub-
system. Instead, a multilayer neural net is trained using the condi-
tions as the inputs and the applicability or nonapplicability of the open
texture term as the output to the neural net.63  The neural net learns
the condition weights and case thresholds during its training. This is
essentially the same approach as taken by Hobson and Slee, and
56. Trevor Bench-Capon, Neural Networks and Open Texture, FoURTH INT'L Corn. ON
ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE & L. 292 (1993).
57. G. van Opdorp, et al., Networs at Work a Connectionist Approach to Non-deductive
Legal Reasoning, Trmn INT'L CorN. oN ARTIFICm.L INTELLIGENCE & L. 278 (1991).
58. While the ability of a neural net to classify patterns even in the presence of noise is
notable, as will be discussed in the next part, defining input as "noise" is dependent on a preex-
isting theory of the domain. This may be problematic. Bench-Capon, supra note 56, at 296.
59. R. F. Walker et al., PROLEXS: Creating Law and Order in a Heterogenous Domain,
INTER'L J. MAN-MAcHINEs Sruoms 35 (1991); see also van Opdorp, supra note 57.
60. Walker, supra note 59, at 55-56.
61. Id. at 56.
62. Id. at 56-57. See also van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 280-81.
63. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 281-84.
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Bench-Capon. It is claimed that this system can provide more dis-
cerning weights than a human expert.f'
ii. Open Texture
Bench-Capon states that in creating his neural net the ability of
neural nets to perform classification in domains involving open texture
has been demonstrated.65 This claim must be questioned. Bench-Ca-
pon did not use a neural net to model solely open textured aspects of
the domain, but the whole domain itself. This can be regarded as an
ironic response to Sergot's attempt to model law purely using rules66
and the criticism and comment that this created.67
Similarly, when creating their neural net, Hobson and Slee treat
issues such as whether an action was dishonest (which is an open tex-
tured issue) as simply any other index point.68 It is up to the creators
(and presumably later users) of the neural net to decide whether these
concepts are present before input is given to the neural net.
The work by Hobson and Slee and Bench-Capon, thus, should
not be viewed strictly as a demonstration of the ability of neural nets
to resolve open texture, but simply as a demonstration of the ability of
neural nets to classify legal cases into desired legal categories.
At this point, the ability of neural nets to resolve issues of open
texture may be.doubted; this is not an area that has yet been directly
investigated. The work, however, has a prima facie appeal: in using
neural nets to classify cases, it appears that analogical reasoning is
being emulated and it is by analogical reasoning that open texture may
be resolved. In the next part the uses of neural nets in computerized
analogical reasoning systems will be discussed in more detail, thereby
giving more credence to the claim that neural nets can aid in the reso-
lution of open texture.
64. Id. at 280-81.
65. Bench-Capon, supra note 56, at 297.
66. See M. L Sergot, et al., The British Nationality Act as a Logic Program, 29 COMM. oF
mar ACM 370 (1986) (describing how the British Nationality Act was translated into a form of
logic for expressing and applying legislation).
67. Refer to the debate conducted in the following articles: Robert Moles, Logic Program-
ming-An Assessment of its Potential for Artificial Intelligence Applications in Law, 2 J.L. &
IhNo. Sci. 137 (1991); John Zeleznikow & Daniel Hunter, Rationalesfor the Continued Develop-
ment of Legal Expert Systems, 3 J.L. & INFo. Sci. 94 (1992); Robert Moles & Surendra Dayal,
There is More to Life than Logic, 3 J.L. & NFo. Sc. 188 (1993); Daniel Hunter et al., There is
Less to This Argument than Meets the Eye, 4 J.L. & INo. Sci. 46 (1993).
68. It is unclear what use Hobson and Slee intend for their index. If it is truly meant to be
used as an index of cases then their treatment of open textured issues is less questionable than if
they intend it to be used within a legal expert system.
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(b) Dealing with Conflicting Rules
A number of researchers have proposed the use of neural nets to
overcome the difficulty of reasoning with conflicting rules of law.
David Warner claims that neural nets can inherently model the legal
reasoning process and that neural nets can model a legal system in
which rules conflict by giving those rules weights.69 However, no de-
tails are given as to how this is to be achieved.
Lothar Philipps agrees that the ability to model conflicting rules
is a benefit of neural nets and has created a neural net designed to
investigate this concept.70 Philipps claims that his neural net can
mimic the results that German courts reach when they assign liabilities
in automobile accidents and, specifically, that his neural net can
mimic the process that occurs when a court is presented with contra-
dictory cases. Contradiction is dealt with by reaching a compromise
solution to the conflict.71 However, while the ability of neural nets to
reach compromise solutions is important, as will be discussed later, it
may not always be jurisprudentially desirable.
In contrast to the approaches of Warner and Philipps, who model
conflicting law on a rule by rule basis through the use of compromise,
Paul Thagard has developed a theory of explanatory coherence that he
says can "choose" between competing hypothesis. Thagard's system,
ECHO, models competing theories using a neural net.72 ECHO
chooses between conflicting groups of rules7" and does not deal with
the conflict through compromise, but accepts or rejects one of the
hypothesis.74
The notion of competing theories should be familiar to lawyers
and legal theorists. In any conflict, there are always at least two com-
peting theories of the law and the facts: that presented by the plaintiff
69. David R. Warner, Jr., The Role of Neural Networks in the Law Machine Development,
16 RuTGERs COMPUTER & TECH. L. J. 129, 135-38 (1990) [hereinafter Role of Neural Networks].
The claim that neural nets can inherently model the process of legal reasoning will be critically
discussed infra, part V.
70. Lothar Philipps, Distribution of Damages in Car Accidents Through the Use of Neural
Networs, 13 CAimozo L. REv. 987 (1991).
71. Id at 989.
72. Paul Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, 12 BEHAv. & BIRmN Sci. 435, 439 (1989)
[hereinafter Thagard, Explanatory Coherence]; Paul Thagard, Connectionism and Legal Infer-
ence, 13 CARDozo L. REv. 1001 (1991) [hereinafter Thagard, Connectionism and Legal Infer-
ence) ). See also GALLANT, supra note 44, chs. 14-15 (explaining how to create inference
networks generally using neural nets.)
73. Though the system could logically be used to resolve conflicts between single rules.
74. See Thagard, Explanatory Coherence, supra note 72, at 435. ECHO requires compet-
ing hypothesis to be given to the system, along with evidence, details of how each hypothesis
explains the evidence and details of how the propositions are contradicted by the evidence.
ECHO then determines which hypothesis best coheres with the evidence. Id.
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and that presented by the defendant. Prima facie, ECHO seems to
provide a possible way to model this conflict in a legal expert system.
Thagard has applied this theory in a simplistic manner to two legal
situations. However, the possibilities in this approach remain largely
unexplored.75
(c) Machine Learning
Along with the above problems with knowledge representation
and manipulation in symbolic reasoning systems, a further problem
with such systems is the expense in developing and maintaining the
knowledge base of the system.76 Neural nets, in contrast, learn their
knowledge, which provides a further attraction to their use in legal
expert systems.
If a neural net is used to store cases, as in some of the work by
Hobson and Slee and in later versions of PROLEXS, then adding new
cases to the neural net's knowledge base is simply a matter of present-
ing those cases to the neural net while it is in its learning mode. The
neural net automatically incorporates the cases into its knowledge base
through modifying its internode weights. Cases still have to be de-
scribed in terms amenable to use in the neural network. However,
later rerationalizations of those cases77 only require the net to be re-
trained, rather than requiring the complete reentry of a newly struc-
tured case database.
An additional way to use neural nets to overcome the knowledge
acquisition bottleneck is through their use in rule induction systems.78
Such systems attempt to model the process of legal induction by ex-
amining numerous cases and attempting to find relations between fac-
tors in those cases that can be explained with a rule.
Although several researchers have proposed the extraction of
rules from neural nets to enhance their explanation facilities, 79 neural
nets have also been used in an attempt to extract rules from a corpus
of cases. In their work on the MAIRILOG project, Laurent Bochereau
75. See Stick, supra note 21, at 363 (noting that many contemporary theories of law are
based upon coherence theories of truth). Thagard's ECHO could be useful in investigating such
theories.
76. Richard Susskind, Expert Systems in Law: A Jurisprudential Approach to Artificial
Intelligence and Legal Reasoning, 49 MOD. L. REv. 168, 184 (1986).
77. See, e.g., Robert Binringhan, A Study After Cardozo: De Cicco v Schweizer, Non-
cooperative Games, and Neural Computing, 47 U. Mima L. Rev. 121 (1992). A rerationalisa-
tion of a case occurs when a later case rationalises the decision in an earlier case on grounds that
are different from those stated in the judgement of the earlier case.
78. See discussion infra part V.A.1.
79. For example, Bench-Capon, supra note 56; van Opdorp et al., supra note 57, at 285;
GALL.w, supra note 44, at 315. See discussion infra part V.A.1.
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et al. propose methods by which logical rules can be extracted from
trained neural networks.80 The rules extracted from the neural net
could then be incorporated into a symbolic reasoning system. Again,
the ability of neural nets to learn new cases is exploited.
Symbolic methods also exist to extract rules from a corpus of
cases, and, as both the use of neural nets and symbolic methods rely
on a statistical analysis of data, attempts to use neural nets to induce
rules share the limitations of these symbolic automatic rule induction
systems. 8' However, the potential for neural nets to incorporate more
flexible notions of analogy 2 than those currently used in other induc-
tion systems, may overcome some of the limitations currently inherent
in automatic rule induction.
B. Use of Neural Nets in Legal Information Retrieval Systems
In contrast to the above neural net applications, which try to rea-
son with the law, neural nets have also been used in systems that
solely try to retrieve information. Computers have long been used to
automate legal information retrieval. However, all have suffered limi-
tations. 83 Most notably, they are brittle in that they rely on keyword
searches.84 Systems employing neural nets remove some of these
limitations.
One of the most interesting legal information retrieval systems
using neural nets is SCALIR.15 Created by Daniel Rose and Richard
Belew, SCALIR is a combination of a neural net embodying sub-
symbolic information integrated with a semantic network86 embodied
in a neural net. SCALIR can perform impressive document retrieval
80. See Laurent Bochereau et al., Extracting Legal Knowledge by Means of a Multilayer
Neural Network Application to Municipal Jurisprudence, THIRD INT'L CONF. ON AjanTiciAL. IN-
TELuGENcE & L. 288 (1991). See also Bench-Capon, supra note 56, at 296. See generally
GALLANT, supra note 44, ch. 17 (presenting a detailed discussion of the extraction of rules from
neural nets).
81. ZEa.azimow & HuNTER, supra note 3, at 272.
82. See discussion infra part V.A.3.a.
83. For a comprehensive discussion of legal information retrieval systems and methods
and their associated limitations, see generally ZEaLzNmow & HUNTER, supra note 3, at 29-52.
84. For example, ifa document is indexed on the term "solicitor" then searching for "law-
yer" will not retrieve it, even though it may be relevant. While this problem can be reduced
using a search on all synonyms this does not guarantee all relevant documents will be retrieved.
Id. at 34.
85. Daniel E. Rose & Richard IC Belew, Legal Information Retrieval: A HybridApproach,
SECOND INT'L CONF. ON ARTmrCmL INTELLIGENCE & L. 138 (1989) [hereinafter Rose & Belew,
Legal Information Retrieval]; Daniel E. Rose & Richard K. Belew, A Connectionist and Sym-
bolic Hybridfor Improving Legal Research, 35 INT'L J. MN-MAHrE SruDrS 1 (1991) [here-
inafter Rose & Belew, Connectionist and Symbolic Hybrid].
86. For a discussion of semantic networks and knowledge representation see generally
ZELEzNow & HuNTER, supra note 3, ch 7.
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operations. For example, Rose and Belew show how SCALIR can
retrieve a copyright case using a term that does not occur in that case.
SCALIR is able to overcome superficial differences in the topic
through its network of term associations. This is more than a simple
synonym search, though, as the system could also perform such a re-
trieval based on the fact that two cases have cited a common case.
An interesting aspect of SCALIR is that one of the neural nets is
used not to store conceptual features of the domain, but rather
microfeatures, such as the fact that a particular word is used in a case
or the fact that two cases are often retrieved together.87 This contrasts
with the use made of neural nets when reasoning with cases, where the
inputs and outputs were all at the conceptual level.
A further notable feature of SCALIR is its ability to learn from
interaction with its users. 8 The system modifies the weights on links
within the networks, depending on the type of searches performed by
users. Thus, Rose and Belew claim that over time the system can
adapt to new terminologies and "the changing importance of cases and
statutes."89
SCALIR is an impressive advance over prior information re-
trieval systems and, as Rose and Belew indicate, the benefits provided
by SCALIR should not be regarded as lying solely in the field of legal
information retrieval.90 It will be argued in the following part that the
combination of subsymbolic and semantic information contained in
SCALIR's neural networks is a powerful and flexible method of emu-
lating the finding of similarity required in legal reasoning. Thus, the
techniques embodied in SCALIR could find wider application as part
of a legal expert system.
The above discussion has provided an introduction to the uses
that neural nets have been put in the law. However, there a number of
problems and concerns associated with these uses of neural nets. The
following part will discuss several more theoretical proposals for the
use of neural nets in law and then proceed to examine problems and
concerns inherent in these proposals and the uses discussed above.
87. Rose & Belew, Legal Information Retrieval, supra note 85, at 141.
88. Rose & Belew, Connectionist and Symbolic Hybrid, supra note 85, at 20-22.
89. Id. at 22.
90. Id. at 30.
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V. JURISPRUDENTIAL AND TECHNICAL CONCERNS IN THE USE OF
NEURAL NETS IN LAW
A. Jurisprudential Concerns about Proposed Uses
As stated in part three, the nature of law and the nature of legal
reasoning are two issues that are inherently intertwined. There is an
oft-made claim that legal expert systems will provide information
about the nature of law and the process of legal reasoning.91 It is
hoped that the use of neural nets in legal expert systems will aid in
this. However, for jurisprudence to gain from the creation of legal
expert systems and specifically from the use of neural nets, lawyers
and legal theorists must be confident that the use of those neural nets
rests on a solid jurisprudential basis.
This part will commence with a discussion of two claims about
the nature of law that neural nets are said to be suited to modelling.
Following this discussion are several jurisprudential observations spe-
cifically concerning current and proposed uses of neural nets in the
law. Finally, a discussion of how neural nets can offer a new meta-
phor of law will be presented.
1. Law as a Parallel Process
Amongst those researchers who advocate the use of neural nets in
the law, perhaps the most wide-ranging and controversial position is
that taken by Warner.92 Warner is of the view that legal reasoning is
an inherently parallel process93 and that "when we attempt to model
the legal reasoning process, we must use a device capable of emulat-
ing the parallel problem-solving process. To this end, normal digital
computational devices are inadequate."94 It is claimed that neural net-
works will overcome this problem due to the inherently parallel nature
of their operation. 95 If taken to its full extreme, Warner's view of the
legal reasoning process as inherently parallel has potentially fatal con-
sequences for traditional symbolic systems. However, apart from such
vague and dubious observations about the nature of legal reasoning,
the full implications of this idea are not explored.
91. Susskind, supra note 76.
92. See generally David Warner, Toward a Simple Law Machine, 29 Jwuixamcs J. 451
(1989) [hereinafter Warner, Simple Law Machine]; David Warner, A Neural Network Based Law
Machine: Initial Steps, 18 RurGERS COMWUTER & TECH. W. 51 (1992) [hereinafter Warner,
Initial Steps]; Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69.
93. Warner, Simple Law Machine, supra note 92, at 461-64; Warner, Role of Neural Net-
works, supra note 69, at 131-32.
94. Warner, Initial Steps, supra note 92, at 53.
95. Id. at 53-54.
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That the legal reasoning process is an inherently parallel process
is highly contentious. It seems acceptable to say, as Warner claims,
that when problems are solved, the solution of "unit problems" will
impose "a state change on the problem domain rendering invalid all
unit solutions previously achieved and changing the environment for
all unit solutions yet to be achieved."96
However, this is not a description of a parallel process. This sim-
ply notes that the answer to one question may change which questions
are subsequently asked. While this undoubtedly occurs in human rea-
soning, the contingent nature of questions is quite easily represented in
a tree diagram. 97 Such tree diagrams form the basis of all rule based
expert systems. Systems such as PROLEXS98 display this "parallel"
problem solving capability by modifying subsequently asked ques-
tions according to intermediate answers. This belief that neural nets
can solve all the problems that currently beset symbolic legal expert
systems is, perhaps unconsciously, echoed by Bench-Capon. He has
attempted to model what, prima facie, appears a rule based area of law
with a neural net.99
If it is accepted that some legal reasoning occurs in parallel, it
still does not mean that all legal reasoning does. It is not in every
legal question that, as Levi would say, the application of the rule
changes the rule itself. Thus, Warner's vision of the necessity of us-
ing neural nets to model the supposedly parallel nature of the legal
reasoning process cannot be supported.
2. Open Texture as Randomness
A further contention made by Warner is his equating of the con-
cept of open texture with the idea of randomness. 100 If this view of
open texture is correct, then little hope can be held for the ability of
lawyers and legal theorists, let alone neural nets or any other legal
expert system, to resolve issues of open texture. After equating open
texture and randomness, it is surprising that Warner then claims that
the use of neural nets can overcome this problem. 10 1
96. Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69, at 132.
97. See ZELEmN ow AND HuNraa, supra note 3, at 118-25. See generally ALAN TYEE,
EXPERT Sysrms IN LAW (1989) (discussing the use of logic and tree diagrams in representing
laws).
98. Walker, supra note 59.
99. Bench-Capon, supra note 56.
100. Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69, at 138-39.
101. Id.
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Perhaps Warner's choice of the term "randomness" was ill-ad-
vised. Warner cites and accepts the work of Gardner' 12 in his argu-
ment for the benefits that neural nets could provide." 3 However,
Gardner suggests that open texture can be dealt with through the use
of heuristics, 1°4 a claim Warner accepts.1'0 Logically, though, if
heuristics exist in a domain, then that domain cannot be regarded as
truly random. Warner is correct however in viewing open texture as
an "indeterminacy."1"6
As argued in part two, the resolution of open texture does not
occur unconstrained, but proceeds through a process of analogy from
past cases. During this reasoning process, the factors that can be taken
into account and the manner in which they can be used are both con-
strained. 0 7 However, the work of critical legal scholars does show
that extra-legal factors may influence which factors will be empha-
sized (or even considered) in a decision. This could make strictly
legal examinations of those decisions conclude that they were
random. 108
Thus, the claim that open texture involves randomness does have
merit in that it highlights the unpredictability of solutions. Even when
all the past cases have been rationalized, the possibility remains that
this rationalization will be destroyed if the present case is decided in a
novel manner; in neural net terms, with the addition of a new input
factor. 0 9 However, even this possibility is constrained by the need
for coherence within the legal system and by the need for the distinc-
tion made to be justifiable." 0 So while the resolution of open texture
may be difficult and sometimes unpredictable, it is not random.
This resolution of problems involving open texture is inherently
intertwined with the nature of analogical reasoning, a subject that will
be discussed next.
102. ANNE VON DER LIETH GARDNER, AN ARTIFICIAL INTELLiGENcE APPROACH TO LEGAL
REAsoNrNG (1987).
103. Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69, at 139.
104. GARDNER, supra note 102, at 41-43 (discussing heuristics as "rules of thumb" used by
experts in a field).
105. Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69, at 139.
106. Id.
107. Kennedy, supra note 25; Jorgen Karpf, Inductive Modelling in Law: Example Based
Expert Systems in Administrative Law, PRoc. oF THE TinD INT'L CONF. ON ArMcimAL InLu-
GENcE & L. 297, 300 (1991) (noting that only certain combinations of factors are legal
combinations).
108. E.g., Kennedy, supra note 25.
109. Birmingham, supra note 77, at 132-34.
110. MAcCORmICK, supra note 14.
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3. Analogy and Explanation
Every legal expert system necessarily embodies a jurisprudential
theory."' The use of neural nets in legal expert systems will affect
the nature of that jurisprudential theory.
(a) Analogy
As noted in part two, a key step in analogical reasoning is the
finding of similarity, or difference, between cases and aspects of a
case. Of course, legal analogical reasoning is much more than the
mere finding of similarity between cases. Once two cases are found to
be similar, there are limitations on the way the cases can be applied." 2
However, when can two things be regarded as the same or different?
i. Theories of Similarity
Mital and Johnson note that there are no entirely satisfactory the-
ories of what constitutes similarity." 3 According to the ruleless the-
ory, there are no general principles applied in a finding of similarity,
people know it when they see it." 4 An alternative, that similarity is
found solely by calculating the number of shared attributes that are
present in a situation cannot be accepted.' If the ruleless theory of
similarity is accepted, then little hope can be held for any formaliza-
tion of the process of finding similarity. However, if it is accepted
that some guidelines are followed, it must be appreciated that it is not
merely the number of attributes that are shared, but also their
relevance." 16
In this context, Celeste Tito has said that two things are necessary
for computers to understand "similarity":
(1) They must understand the analogue meaning of words; and,
It11. Susskind, supra note 76, at 183.
112. See MAcComic., supra note 14; LEvI, supra note 22; BURTON, supra note 22; Gor-
dley, supra note 39; Sunstein, supra note 39; Murray, supra note 16; Kevin Ashley, Toward a
Computational Theory of Arguing with Precedent, PROc. OF THE TmRD INT'L CONF. ON ARTIFI-
ciAL INTELLimNcE & L. 93 (1991). However, the finding of similarity between cases is a
prerequisite to any subsequent manipulations of the analogy.
113. V. MrrAL AND L. JOHNsON, ADvANCED INFORMATION SYSTEMS FOR LAWYERS 257
(1992). See also Celeste Tito, Artificial Intelligence: Can Computers Understand Why Two
Legal Cases Are Similar?, 7 CompuTER/L.J. 409, 411-12 (1987). But cf. BURTON, supra note 22,
at 39 (stating that the process is nevertheless a mystery).
114. MrrAL & JOH'soN, supra note 113, at 257 (noting that the ruleless theory has been
criticised because it would mean that people would not be able to say why or in what aspects two
cases are similar).
115. MrrAL & JoHNsoN, supra note 113.
116. Id.
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(2) They must understand moral decision making.' 17
According to Tito, it is necessary to understand the analogue meaning
of words to determine whether something is within a general category.
Similarly, moral decisions must be made when determining at what
level of generality things are to be compared.
While Tito says she is not interested in whether computers can
mimic the results achieved by lawyers, but whether they can actually
understand analogical reasoning,11 her work does not consider the
philosophical problems of what constitutes intelligence and under-
standing in computers.' 19 Tito's work is still informative, however, if
viewed as a discussion on the ability of computers to mimic the results
achieved by lawyers.
A problem that faces all legal expert systems, including those that
incorporate neural nets, is that they only model legal concepts. It is
unavoidable that when an issue in the real world is to be considered by
a computer, it has to be circumscribed by a limited number of factors.
This circumscription will inevitably involve a loss of richness and the
creation of a conceptual bias 2 ° in the computerized representation of
the concept as compared to the real world concept. In Tito's concep-
tion, the computer only has a digital representation of concepts.
Though this loss will be inversely proportional to, and dependent on,
the complexity of the composition of the matrix used in the circum-
scription, if the input matrix does not accurately reflect the real world
concept, then the conclusion drawn by the legal expert system will not
be accurate.
It is as yet unclear whether the necessity of understanding moral
decision making for the finding of similarity is a fundamental bar to
computers performing analogical reasoning. Computers may yet be
implemented that do this, though what this entails is presently unclear.
ii. Similarity and Neural Nets
In the quest to find similarity, neural nets can conceivably be
used in several ways:
117. Tito, supra note 113. See also MAcCoRMwcK, supra note 14 (arguing that the finding
of an analog depends on the view of what purpose the legal system is trying to achieve). Cf.
Sunstein, supra note 39, at 773-81 & n.116 (noting the need for a general theory with which to
evaluate similarities and thinks this should cause skepticism about efforts to program computers
to engage in analogical reasoning).
118. Tito, supra note 113.
119. For a concise discussion on this issue see the debate between John Searle, et al., Artifi-
cial Intelligence a Debate, Sci. AM. 262(1), 19 (1990) (providing a particularly interesting dis-
cussion of neural nets).
120. Karpf, supra note 107, at 299.
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(a) By comparing matrices of factors;
(b) By determining weights to be given to factors that are used in
other systems;
(c) By identifying new factors that are common to members of a
group; and
(d) By determining similarity in a less reductionist fashion than the
above.
For present purposes, approaches (a) and (b) are essentially the same.
Both rely on matrices of factors being presented to a neural net.
Although a neural net can classify patterns, deal with complex rela-
tionships and subtle variations in factors, and thereby determine simi-
larity by determining how many attributes are shared, a key aspect of
the finding of similarity has already been performed by the designer.
The designer of the system has already made the all important deci-
sion as to what limited factors are to be considered relevant for a de-
termination of similarity and, further, at what level of generality they
are to be compared.
In this scenario, Tito's requirements mean that the computer can
only find similarity at the level of attribute matching; more subtle as-
pects of similarity are outside the computer's scope. For this reason,
systems such as PROLEXS that adopt the matrix approach will only
ever have limited ability to reason analogically.
However, if a matrix can be chosen that can accurately model a
real world concept,121 then that matrix can be implemented in a neural
net. This is a corollary of Kolmogorov's theorem. 22
A key requirement in this approach is choosing the matrix used to
represent the concept. But what factors are to be included? Neural
nets could also conceivably be used to identify new factors that are
common to a group. Bench-Capon shows how neural nets can find
which factors are significant amongst noise, 2" but claims that the sig-
nificance of these factors cannot be understood without independent
knowledge of the domain. 4
To say that the significance of such factors cannot be understood
without prior domain knowledge, though, is not to say that the newly
identified factors are not significant. According to some members of
the critical legal studies movement, the reasons given in cases are not
the whole list of reasons for the reaching of the results in those
121. "Accurately" is here being taken to mean: model to a degree of richness that is suffi-
cient to satisfy lawyers.
122. See supra part II (discussing Kolmogorov's theorem).
123. Bench-Capon, supra note 56.
124. Id. at 296-97.
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cases.12 If this view of law is correct, then legal analysis and legal
expert systems based solely on those decisions will not accurately re-
flect how and why cases are decided. Instead one should simply look
at what actually occurs. Thus, when an analysis of a neural net high-
lights the importance of an unsuspected factor, this could be inter-
preted as telling us something important about the underlying legal
domain. Consequently, the use made of noise is dependent on what
jurisprudential theory the system's developers adopt; whether it is in-
terpreted as a discovery about the law or is rejected as a technical
anomaly.
The most promising approach to modelling similarities is the less
reductionist approach taken by SCALIR.' 26 Here, similarity is not
judged solely on the presence or absence of specified factors, but also
on the presence of subfactor information. Thus, even though two in-
put matrices may share few factors at the conceptual level, they can
still be regarded as similar if they directly or indirectly share common
microfeatures. In this respect, SCALIR contains a closer approxima-
tion to employing the analogue meaning of words than do other
systems.
However, before SCALIR type similarity determination can be
implemented in a legal expert system, rather than solely a document
retrieval system, the system's developers will have to choose how in-
direct a sharing of common microfeatures will amount to two objects
being regarded as similar. This is equivalent to choosing at what level
of generality the two objects are to be considered. Further, the ap-
proach adopted in SCALIR is still dependent on the system's design-
ers choosing what concepts are to be used to model the legal domain.
Thus, within Tito's framework it is still not possible to say the system
implements moral decision making. However, in incorporating a
closer approximation to the analogue meaning of words, the method to
determine similarity adopted in SCALIR is more subtle than those in
other neural net systems or that exist in symbolic reasoning systems.
It cannot be doubted, then, that neural nets can mimic the finding
of similarity, though on a restricted basis. However, the accuracy of
the similarity found will depend greatly on the composition of the ma-
trix chosen by developers to describe the legal concepts.
iii. Open Texture
Two observations about the use of neural nets to resolve open
texture can now be made. Since the similarity found by neural nets is
125. See generally Kennedy, supra note 25.
126. See supra part IV.B (discussing the operation of SCALIR).
19961
62 COMPUTER & HIGH TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL
crude compared to that achieved by humans, there is much scope for
real world decisions to differ from those reached by neural nets be-
cause unconsidered factors will have been taken into account.1 27 Sec-
ondly, legal analogical reasoning is not simply the finding of
similarity between cases but involves manipulating the analogy found
to achieve a desired result. 2 This is something that neural nets of
themselves cannot perform. Consequently, by themselves neural nets
have a limited ability to perform analogical reasoning. The ability of
neural net systems to generalize input patterns and to perform a flexi-
ble form of similarity determination, however, makes them strong can-
didates for use in a hybrid analogical reasoning system
(b) Explanation and Justification
The use of neural nets as legal analogical reasoners faces a fur-
ther problem. Mital and Johnson state that, "similarity cannot be
thought of as an agent independent of the objects which are to be
found similar; it may be said that it is more in the nature of a relation
which the mind perceives after the fact."129 Since similarity does not
exist independently of our perception of it, creating this perception is
of crucial importance. Unfortunately, this presents problems for neu-
ral nets. Presently, neural nets take a series of inputs and oracularly
produce an output; it is left to the user of the system to infer why
similarity was found.
Creating such a perception involves two things, explaining why
the similarity was found and then justifying the finding. Several
methods have been proposed to get explanations and justifications
from neural nets, four of which are the following:
(1) Extract rules from the neural net;1?°
(2) Present to the user those nodes (factors) that had a positive con-
tributory influence along with those that had a negative contribu-
tory influence on the decision;13 1
127. Walker, supra note 59, at 63; Birmingham, supra note 77, at 132-34.
128. See generally LEvi, supra note 22; MACCORMICK, supra note 14; BuRToN, supra note
22; Gordley, supra note 39; Sunstein, supra note 39; Murray, supra note 16; Ashley, supra note
112.
129. MrrAL & JoHNSON, supra note 113, at 256.
130. Compare Bochereau, supra note 80 (construing neural nets as being used specifically
to extract rules) with David Warner, A Neural Network-based Law Machine: the Problem of
Legitimacy, 2(2) LAw CoMPur Rs & ARTIFICIAL INTELLGENCE 135, 141 (1993) [hereinafler
Warner, The- Problem of Legitimacy] (arguing rules will be extracted at run time in response to
questioning). It is possible that the latter approach would provide more flexibility.
131. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 285. Cf Warner, The Problem of Legitimacy, supra
note 130, at 139 (additionally attributing percentages of the input variables to the output
variables).
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(3) Present the training set of the neural net to the user; 132 and
(4) Create a hybrid system where the output of the neural net is
explained ex post facto by other systems.'33
The essential purpose of providing explanation and justification
is to convince the human end user of the correctness of the result
achieved and, in this respect, the intended audience and use of the
system must be remembered. 13
4
Stephen Gallant has given a detailed analysis of how rules can be
extracted from neural nets,131 though as Bench-Capon notes, we can-
not be sure of the correctness of any rules derived from a neural net
unless we have prior knowledge about the domain itself.136
However, while rules may provide an explanation of a result, it is
hard to regard them as a justification. If a domain expert were asked,
"How did you reach that conclusion?," a first answer might be, "It just
came to me." Pressed further, the new response might be, "Factors X,
Y and Z were present and this points to that result." A neural net can
give a similar explanation by saying, "Factors X, Y and Z were pres-
ent and this points to the result because they achieved that result in
other cases." The expert (or neural net) might go further and formu-
late this last response with a rule such as, "Whenever factors X, Y and
Z are present, then this result was achieved." As an explanation, this
seems satisfactory: it was because of experience that the expert and
neural net gave that result. A search for a more detailed explanation
from a neural net, if even possible, 137 seems unnecessary.
Asking why the result is justified is different. What amounts to
sufficient justification for a decision depends on the jurisprudential
theory of law to which one subscribes. If one regards as justified a
decision based solely on the fact that such a decision was reached in
past situations,- then "if... then.. ." rules as discussed above may be
accepted as both explanation and justification; they are simply a short-
hand way of saying this. However, if one's jurisprudential theory re-
quires a more detailed justification, then it remains an open question
whether a neural net can justify its results. Detailed justification may
be possible using other systems, although a prerequisite is the adop-
tion of a jurisprudential theory on what amounts to justification.
132. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 285.
133. Id.
134. Lambert and Grunewald, supra note 46; ZELEZNmOW AND Humn, supra note 3, at
273-75.
135. GALL.w, supra note 44, at ch. 17.
136. Bench-Capon, supra note 56, at 296.
137. E.g., DANIEL DENNEr, CoNscaousNEss ExPLAED 84-95 (1991) (arguing that these
are aspects of human action that humans cannot themselves explain).
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Proposals (b) and (c) for achieving explanations and justifications
from neural nets are slightly different. In both cases, it is simply left
to the user to infer why the information presented justifies the result
achieved. The PROLEXS team stated that these approaches have not
proved satisfactory. 138 Proposal (d), that of justifying the output of a
neural net ex post facto, has not yet been reported as implemented
though theoretical work is underway.139
Thus, it can be seen that neural nets have a limited ability to
justify their results.
4. Inducing Rules
The work of Bochereau et al. and Bench-Capon have demon-
strated that it is possible to extract rules from a trained neural net.
Such rule induction, though, suffers the same problems as symbolic
rule induction systems.'14 Essentially, all such rule induction is based
on a statistical analysis of the underlying data. Thus, if the data is not
statistically representative, then any rules induced could be spurious.
However, the flexible notion of similarity able to be embodied in
a neural net may make neural nets more useful rule-induction systems
than are current symbolic systems. As with analogical reasoning, a
key step in inductive reasoning is the finding of similarity between
cases so as to found a general rule. In traditional systems, such simi-
larity is simply based on the presence or absence of factors chosen by
the system designer. As discussed above, SCALIR embodies a more
flexible notion of analogy than simple attribute matching. For this
reason, a rule-induction system adopting SCALIR's concepts might be
able to create relations and, thus, rules that would not be found with a
symbolic system. It is conceivable that the more flexible approach to
analogy embodied in SCALIR would improve rule induction. No
work, however, has been undertaken on this point.
5. Compromise
Systems that model conflicts between rules by using compromise
were discussed in part four. However, the use of neural nets to model
contradictory rules is problematic. Philipps states that, "The neurons
strive for equilibrium, and when the conditions of the equilibrium are
translated into the terms of the case, the resulting solution cannot be
138. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 285.
139. See Zm.zNxmow & Hturra, supra note 3, at 273-75 (discussing the SPLIT-UP
system).
140. Id.
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totally unjust.' 14 ' The equating of justice with compromise is ques-
tionable. Firstly, the two rules that were balanced may violate princi-
ples of formal justice, or they might offend against moral principles, in
which case the resulting compromise cannot be said to be just. More
fundamentally, justice does not necessarily equate with compromise.
If justice is understood as meaning, "The result that a court of law
would reach," then equating justice with compromise is unsupport-
able. Courts do not always achieve a result that is a compromise of
the presented claims. 42 The point is not that compromise is never just
or that what a court of law would do is just, only that in equating
justice with compromise, a jurisprudential statement is being made
that requires support. Thus, attempting to deal with conflicting rules
through the use of compromise is not necessarily a desirable path. It
depends on one's theory of justice. 143
Used in the manner of Philipps, neural nets can only deal with
contradiction through compromise. 44  Thagard's ECHO145 has the
potential to overcome this difficulty, as it does not model conflict
through compromise. However, ECHO has problems of its own,146
not least of which is the complexity of its representations. Since
Thagard has not given detailed discussion of the legal use of ECHO,
the possibility of using this system to model conflicting legal rules
remains to be explored.
6. SCALIR Learning
Similar jurisprudential considerations arise from the proposal to
make SCALIR learn from its users. 47 As an information retrieval
tool this seems reasonable, any reasoning will be performed by the
lawyer using the retrieved documents. However, if SCALIR were to
be incorporated as part of a larger legal expert system, then such learn-
ing may not be justifiable.
141. Philipps, supra note 70, at 999.
142. E.g., The Queen v. Watson; Exparte Armstrong 136 C.L.R. 248, 249 (1976) (demon-
strating that the High Court was forced to reject totally one line of authority when faced with
conflicting lines of authority as to what amounted to judicial bias).
143. E.g., MrrA. & JOHNsON, supra note 113, at 259 (indicating that a conflict between the
interpretation of factors within a case may be solved by the use of compromise).
144. See infra V.B.2 (discussing the practical implications of the necessity of ensuring the
neural net is not presented with contradictory input).
145. See supra part IV.
146. ECHO requires competing hypothesis to be entered into the neural net along with their
supporting facts. How each hypothesis is supported by evidence and what evidence contradicts
what hypothesis then has to be entered by the system designer. Such decisions can be highly
subjective and it is unclear what implications these requirements could have on the use of ECHO
in the legal domain.
147. Rose & Belew, A Connectionist and Symbolic Hybrid, supra note 85, at 20-22.
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Under Rose and Belew's proposal, learning in SCALIR would
alter the very representation of the documents in the system. Conse-
quently, a legal expert system adopting this approach would poten-
tially alter its representation of the law each time it was used. Such a
scenario has elements of the critical legal studies view that law is
whatever we make it. 4 Aspects of this view may be true in the case
of real lawyers and real judges. However, it is slightly bizarre to ex-
tend this to a legal expert system which has no direct affect on actual
legal outcomes.
7. Normative Reasoning
Finally, it has been suggested that neural nets cannot model the
legal decision making process because they cannot apply norms.14 9
This is debatable.
If it is meant that neural nets cannot apply norms because of their
normative content, this is incorrect. To the extent that norms can be
expressed in terms of cases or rules, they can be modelled using a
neural net. Any normative content in these cases or rules is irrelevant
for this purpose. Indeed the very basis on which neural nets operate
can be viewed as an application of the norm that like cases should be
decided alike.
If it is meant that norms cannot be expressed in terms of cases,
but must be represented as rules, then it still cannot be accepted that
neural nets cannot model legal decisions. It is possible that localist
neural nets150 can be used to model norms.
If it is meant that neural nets cannot apply norms because they
have no normative content for the neural net itself, then this is also
debatable. This is tied to the question of whether neural nets and com-
puters can think, which, though beyond the scope of the paper, is still
an open question.151
However, it may be true that the result received from a neural net
cannot force a value decision. This touches on moral philosophical
questions that are also beyond the scope of this paper.
148. Kennedy, supra note 25.
149. MrrAL & JoHNsoN, supra note 113, at 253.
150. Neural nets can be classified not only according to their learning rules and architec-
tures, but also as distributed or localist networks. In distributed networks, of which adaptive
filter networks are one type, only the nodes at the input and output levels represent real world
concepts, hidden layers are simply there to aid in the mapping performed by the network. In
localist models, each node of the network represents a real world concept.
151. Searle, supra note 119.
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B. Methodological Concerns in the Use of Neural Nets
In addition to the general jurisprudential issues associated with
neural nets so far discussed, the manner in which neural nets are actu-
ally implemented in legal applications has implications for the juris-
prudential theory embodied in the system. 152 The two most troubling
aspects of the many uses discussed in the previous part are the use of
hypotheticals to train neural nets and the manner with which contra-
dictory data is dealt.
1. Hypotheticals
Neural nets rely on statistical analysis of the underlying data
presented during training. Thus, to create accurate models, they re-
quire data that is statistically representative.
In their discussion of the uses of neural nets in law, Mital and
Johnson note that much of the law remains unreported and that neither
all possible nor all anticipated situations have been covered even by
unreported cases.153 This presents significant problems for the crea-
tion of neural nets in law. As outlined in the introduction to neural
networks, neural nets create generalizations from the information
presented to them during their training. The quality of these general-
izations (in respect to the degree they reflect the actual outcomes of
cases) is dependent on the cases used to train the network. A lack of
cases will lead to spurious generalizations.15 4
The lack of reported cases with which to train neural nets has
been reported by a number of researchers.15 5 In an attempt to over-
come this problem, researchers have resorted to creating hypothetical
cases with which to train their neural nets.'56 It must be realized how-
ever, that once a neural net has been trained with any hypotheticals,
152. Apart from the discussion of the use of hypotheticals and compromise which follows,
it should be noted that the study of neural nets is still a comparatively embryonic field. A multi-
tude of network designs exist from which application developers can choose. Designs generally
have numerous design parameters the values of which can be chosen more or less ad hoc. Both
the type of network design used and the values of the parameters chosen, affect the behaviour of
the neural net. How many hidden layers to include in the neural net and how many nodes to
include in each of those layers, the learning rule and learning rate, the amount of noise present
when the network is trained and even the order in which training examples are presented to the
neural net can all affect the neural net's behaviour and the classifications it produces. Thus these
factors can affect the way the neural net reasons with the information presented to it. However,
the legal literature discussing neural nets does not discuss such issue, with the exception of Rose
& Belew, supra note 85.
153. MrrAL & JoHNsoN, supra note 113, at 265.
154. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 282-84.
155. E.g., Karpf, supra note 107; Hobson and Slee, supra note 54; Walker, supra note 59.
156. Hobson and Slee, supra note 54, at 12; Walker, supra note 59, at 57. Cf. Bench-Capon,
supra note 56 (discussing use of hypotheticals to train the author's ANN within an entirely
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then, unless one subscribes to a critical theory of law, it is no longer a
system that reasons solely with the law.'57 It is an amalgam of the law
and expert belief. This may or may not be problematic, depending on
the purpose the system is designed to achieve.
Training with hypotheticals is said to incorporate the heuristic
knowledge of the domain expert. 158 It seems justifiable to argue that
predicted case outcomes generated by an expert do incorporate heuris-
tic knowledge about how an expert would reason with a sparse set of
cases, but the conclusion remains that any result reached by the sys-
tem is not based solely on the law.
If it is decided to use hypotheticals, it seems necessary that they
at least be generated by a domain expert. In Bench-Capon's neural
net, all the hypotheticals were generated by another computer pro-
gram.' 59 At the very least, the rules in this program should be gener-
ated by a domain expert. But in such a case, the question arises why
these rules are not simply incorporated into a symbolic reasoner.
Philipps has argued that his neural net need only be trained with
ten training examples, as long as they are "prototypical."' 60 However,
while this may be true in the case of the simple rules that were there
modelled, it seems difficult to apply to neural nets trained with cases
and designed to resolve open texture.
The lack of training data needs to be addressed if neural nets are
to be created that reason with the law.
2. Contradictory Input Data
A further problem facing the use of neural nets in law is the way
in which they model conflicting data. Neural nets model conflicts in
data by reaching a compromise between the conflicts. As previously
argued, this may or may not be jurisprudentially acceptable.
If modelling conflict through compromise is jurisprudentially un-
acceptable, then in the training of the neural net it is extremely impor-
tant to ensure that contradictory examples are not included in the
training set. This is a huge difficulty. It is unclear how to determine
whether two cases are conflicting if those cases differ in more than
hypothetical legal domain). But see Karpf, supra note 107, at 299 (criticizing the use of
hypotheticals).
157. Similar observations can be made of case based reasoners. There is a large element of
expert opinion as to what the relevant factors in a domain are, which cases are to be included in
the knowledge base and whether those cases do or do not contain those relevant factors.
158. Van Opdorp, supra note 57, at 285.
159. Bench-Capon, supra note 56. Cf Hobson and Slee, supra note 54 (making no mention
of how hypotheticals are generated).
160. Philipps, supra note 70, at 995-996.
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one aspect. Unless techniques can be created to determine where con-
tradictions exist in a training set, doubt must be cast on the practical
possibility of using neural nets to reason with the law.
Finally, in contrast to the work of researchers in legal expert sys-
tems and legal information retrieval systems, who are concerned with
the practical uses of neural nets, several jurisprudes have also pro-
posed using neural nets as a metaphor for the operation of law in soci-
ety; as a representation of the interaction between the legislature, the
courts and citizens. 1
61
A detailed description of such a neural net theory of law has been
given by Alexander Silverman,162 who sees the law as a huge neural
net in which:
The judges and other legal actors are nodes of the network; the
published case reports and statutes, teaching in the law schools,
continuing education courses and learning on the job, and the infor-
mal and formal oral communications among the members of the
legal community are the connections between nodes; the cases and
statutes themselves are the patterns presented to and learned by the
network.16
3
This is a descriptive theory of law 64 that sits between positivist and
critical theories of law. The law is not the application of objective
facts, but nor is it merely the preferences of individual judges. 165 In-
stead, no single actor or single rule determines the outcome of a case;
the outcome emerges from the interaction of the whole system.'
66
Similarly, under this theory rules and theories of law are to be re-
garded only as approximations of the underlying law, much as a neu-
ral net constructs a mathematical function to approximate the
distinctions present in its input data.' 6
7
While the practical implementation of such a neural net is far
beyond current capabilities, this is not Silverman's aim. According to
Silverman, "At the most general level, our metaphor of law matters
... new metaphors of law can lead to an increased awareness of alter-
161. Warner, Role of Neural Networks, supra note 69, at 138 (claiming that this view is
inherent in the works of Anthony D'Amato).
162. ALEXANDER SiLvERMaN, MIND, MAcHINE, AND METAPHOR: AN ESSAY ON ARTnFICIAL
INTE IGENCE AND LEGAL REAso No (1993).
163. Id. at 80.
164. Id. at 81.
165. Id. at 80.
166. Id. at 80, 84-86 (explaining that an expanded version of this theory sees law not only
as an interconnected network, but also as an interconnected network that 'resonates' with soci-
ety; the law both influences and is influenced by the society in which it is constructed).
167. IdM at 81-83.
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natives for the legal system." 6 ' With a new metaphor, the way we
think about judges, law, society and our role therein, can radically
change.
VI. CONCLUSION
Resurgent interest in neural nets has resulted in various applica-
tions in law. While neural nets do not have the potential to solve all
problems present in current efforts to computerize legal knowledge,
the use of neural nets does offer potentially great benefits in both the
creation of legal expert systems and legal information retrieval
systems.
Most promising is the ability of neural nets to aid in the determi-
nation of similarity between cases. The finding of similarity is a key
step in the process of legal reasoning. Any legal expert system that
seeks to model legal knowledge has to incorporate a means to deter-
mine similarity.
Neural nets offer a model of similarity that is more flexible than
those found in existing symbolic reasoning systems and so have huge
potential for use in legal expert systems.
Neural nets potentially offer other benefits, such as a means to
model conflicts in rules and cases. Their ability to learn information
adds further attraction to their use.
However, using neural nets to model conflict and to learn infor-
mation has jurisprudential implications. The need for statistically sig-
nificant numbers of cases with which to train neural nets, the
jurisprudential implications of using hypotheticals during training, the
need to ensure that training data is not contradictory and the currently
limited ability of neural nets to justify their responses, all limit the
present usefulness of neural nets in legal expert systems. While tech-
niques have been proposed that potentially overcome both problems of
contradiction and the ability to justify conclusions, little work has ac-
tually been conducted on these techniques. It must be ensured that the
jurisprudential implications associated with these limitations do not
undermine the overall project in which the use of neural nets is play-
ing a part.
While neural nets can offer a new metaphor for law, it is only
through future research that creates hybrid neural net/symbolic reason-
ing systems that we will truly be able to use computers to test the
implications of our current jurisprudential theories.
168. Id. at 94-95.
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